The Plant Simulator as viable means to prevent and manage risk through competencies management: Experiment results  by Colombo, Simone & Golzio, Luigi
Safety Science 84 (2016) 46–56Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /ssc iThe Plant Simulator as viable means to prevent and manage risk through
competencies management: Experiment resultshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.11.021
0925-7535/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 02 23996538; fax: +39 02 70638173.
E-mail address: simone.colombo@polimi.it (S. Colombo).Simone Colombo a,⇑, Luigi Golzio b
aDipartimento di Chimica, Materiali e Ingegneria Chimica ‘‘Giulio Natta”, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, 20133 Milano, Italy
bDipartimento di Economia ‘‘Marco Biagi”, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Via Jacopo Berengario, 51, 41100 Modena, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 30 August 2015
Accepted 25 November 2015
Available online 14 December 2015
Keywords:
Experiment-based decision-making
Plant Simulator
Performance Assessment
Immersive Virtual Environments
Operator training simulatorMaking decisions and managing competences in complex systems is a challenging task to accomplish.
Specifically, the process industry is known for its complexity and sensitivity to critical procedures.
Recent disasters like the ‘‘Deepwater Horizon” (2010, 11 fatalities), BP Texas City (2005, 15 fatalities),
and AZF Toulouse (2001, 29 fatalities), clearly showed the risk to which we are all exposed. The increasing
complexity of processes, due to the simultaneous escalation of automation, optimisation and intensifica-
tion processes (followed to face globalisation challenges), are moving the attention to the management of
abnormal situations, which are even more complex in nature and frequent. This increasing complexity,
coupled with the fact that abnormal situations may lead to irreversible losses, is imposing the adoption
of adequate approaches and tools that allow for better learning and properly managing abnormal situa-
tions. The paper presents a simulation-enabled, experiment-based approach that can be used to prevent
and manage risk through competencies management. More specifically, the paper presents the results of
the first experiment campaign performed in a Plant Simulator (PS), the first known in the process indus-
try domain, and shows the efficacy of using Immersive Virtual Environments (IVE) both to make decisions
and to train teams (not just single operators).
The experiment results presented in the paper show the effectiveness of IVE to increase the competen-
cies and train operators and managers. In addition, they explain how conveniently the data collected by
means of the PS can be used for making daily decisions to better prevent and manage risks.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The optimization, intensification, and automation processes
taking place in industry to face globalization are significantly
increasing the complexity of productive processes. This transfor-
mation is making progressively difficult to anticipate and predict
the combined effects that those transformation processes have
on operations, thus practically translating into complex systems
that are increasingly difficult to manage and operate.
Operations of safety–critical systems (Knight, 2002; Pimentel,
2003), such as those of the health, the nuclear, the aviation and
the process sectors are certainly difficult to manage and complex
to operate and, consequently, the task of managing the competen-
cies, needed by operators and managers to cope with their com-
plexity, is increasingly difficult. The Board that investigated the
loss of the Columbia space shuttle noted that ‘‘complex systems
almost always fail in complex ways” (NASA, 2003). Actually, whenan accident takes place in such complex systems, it is always
tempting to ascribe to one crucial error and point the finger at
one bad operator. Failing to identify the real, complex causes is
highly risky as any reductive (accident) reconstruction provides a
dangerously incomplete or distorted picture of what really went
on. This distortion negatively influences the subsequent decision-
making process (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004; Lundberga, 2010), as deci-
sions are grounded on misleading conclusions (as partial). Further,
the simplistic or distorted picture does not have either all or the
correct details to unveil the cause-consequence chain that brought
to the accident. This leaves those who contributed to the accident
but were ‘‘untouched” by the accident (i.e. were not mentioned in
the investigation report) unaware of their contribution, thus risk-
ing to leaving space to (or even reinforcing) the dangerous compla-
cency that led to the accident.
Amongst others, it is thanks to Perrow (1984), Sagan (1993),
Reason (1990a, 1993, 1997), Weick and Sutcliffe (2001),
Hollnagel (2004), and Hollnagel et al. (2006) that the organiza-
tional dimension of accidents became clear, enabling opera-
tions safety to start going beyond the classical, technical,
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organizational and systemic dimension. These studies and theories
have been very useful and enlightening as they allowed to
understanding that the shop floor activity is (tightly) linked to
the managerial one and, being the two (tightly) coupled, whatever
happens to one activity influences the other. In addition, the higher
the coupling level the higher and quicker the reciprocal influence.
What these studies did not help to clarify and solve is the very
root cause of accidents: the (human) difficulty of learning and
acting (i.e. operating) in complex systems. Before enlarging the
perspective to the organization, many studies and ground-
breaking theories came off the research scene. It is thanks to
Rasmussen (1986), Reason (1990b), Hollnagel (1994, 1998), and
Endsley (1995) that the human role and dimension in highly auto-
mated systems became clear: a system’s function which is more
devoted to performing supervisory rather than manual tasks,
i.e. cognitive rather than physical tasks.
Wickens and Hollands (2000) clearly explained the complexity
that operators have to face during operations. According to such
authors, industrial processes are generally highly complex and
involve a high number of interacting variables and many degrees
of freedom (Moray, 1997). Variables can be cross-coupled, so that
changes in one variable affect several other variables simultane-
ously. Further, the effect of the change in one process variable,
e.g. opening a valve on a Distributed Control System (DCS) to
increase a mass flow, may significantly differ in time and space,
thus making it very difficult to envisage the overall effect on the
plant. Modern control rooms comprise more than 5000 synoptic
displays and thousands of control loops and related alarms to get
the whole picture of these processes (Sheridan, 2006; Vicente
et al., 2004). Such complexity can severely overburden the opera-
tor’s mental model of the status of the plant, thus making extre-
mely difficult to identify the state of the plant. The mental model
of the status of the plant, however, is critical for both normal oper-
ations, i.e. nominal conditions, and abnormal situations. The added
stress and anxiety experienced during an abnormal situation may
increase the cognitive load and attention requirements of the
operator (Wickens and McCarley, 2008). For this reason, it is of
paramount importance to anticipate, measure, and assess what
might be the effects on learners’ performance caused by both an
increase of plant complexity (typically due to process and/or
interface changes) and abnormal situations.
Understanding and learning the complexity of the process by
following the correct procedures and keeping a good level of (situ-
ation) awareness and readiness during both nominal and abnormal
conditions is the important task an operator is responsible to man-
age. On the other hand, measuring and assessing these capabilities
with the ultimate goal of identifying the necessary competencies
and tools operators need to have to safely face their daily duties
is the task an operations manager is responsible for. Today, due
to the increasing high complexity, both these tasks are challenging
already during nominal operating conditions; accomplish them
during abnormal situations might turn out to be a struggle. Aim
of this paper is to propose a viable way forward to both these
challenges.2. The simulation teaching method and the learning theory
The simulation is an active teaching method founded on the
problem-based learning (PBL), which is a general model developed
in medical education in the early 70ies; since then it has been
adopted in an increasing number of other education disciplines
(Business Administration, Architecture, Engineering) to replace
the traditional lecture-based approach (Savery and Duffy, 2001).
In the PBL perspective the learner faces an unstructured problem,which reflects a complex work situation (i.e. identifying and pre-
venting specific risks), whose solution is to make an individual or
group decision with colleagues (the superior or peers) according
to the nature of the risk at stake.
The application of the simulation teaching method is particu-
larly suitable in safety education: learners live vivid, realistic expe-
rience in a virtual environment (which replicates the concrete
work situation) of how to make decisions to manage dangerous
and unexpected events. The learning situation is completely safe
as learners’ wrong decisions and behaviours do not have real, dan-
gerous effects and consequences can be traced and measured for
further investigation (e.g. root cause analyses).
The PBL (or simulation-enabled approach) is founded on the
constructivism theory, which is based on the following four
assumptions, namely: (1) learning depends on the previous knowl-
edge of the trainee; (2) the design of the education or training pro-
cess must be learner’s centred; (3) the teacher/trainer is
responsible to design a learning situation where the trainee is
enabled to explore problems, make decisions and find solutions
autonomously; and (4) the correct behaviour is rationalized with
the application of the theory at the end of the learning process
(and not on the contrary) (Del Fiore and Martinotti, 2006). In the
constructivism research program, the situated and social learning
sub theory (Lave, 1988) defines the knowledge as expertise, that
is practice knowledge in action, embedded in an wider organisa-
tional action system. Consequently, the learning process is neces-
sarily situated in a specific environment, which is formed of
technological artefacts (and even of other persons like trainees
and/or trainer/teacher) with which the learner interacts. The learn-
ing process is then twofold: individual and social (Bandura, 1986).
The simulation-based approach (which based on an IT infras-
tructure or artefact) is known as a virtual reality simulation, i.e. a
technology-based learning (Tarique, 2014). It is composed by three
elements: ICT created environments, agency and isomorphic repre-
sentation (Cerande, 1993). Virtual environments offer the possibil-
ity to recreate the real world as it is or new ones (particularly
useful during the design phase of a project). Agency (or interactiv-
ity) enables the learner to be active by interacting with the virtu-
ally risky situations (and make decisions). The isomorphic
representation (or placement) of the body’s learner (or its body’s
parts) or its total immersion is where the learner experiences the
virtual environment as immediate and through multiple senses.
The application of virtual reality simulation/simulators has several
advantages in developing safety skills to prevent and manage risks
in industry. It improves the recipient’s absorptive capacity (both at
individual and group level), providing expertise that help learners
understanding work situations and problems and in improving
their decisions process (Pasqualotti and Dal Sasso Freitas, 2002).
Trainees acquire more information if more senses are involved in
the learning process; they are more receptive when they see, listen,
hear, communicate and act at the same time (Barraclough and
Guymer, 1998). The virtual reality simulation is a valuable substi-
tute for dangerous real experiences as it allows for learners to
acquire tacit knowledge that otherwise will not be transferred
trough traditional educational methods (book, manual, lessons).
This is relevant in the case of organisations that require nearly
error free operations, because otherwise they are likely to incur
in catastrophes (Roberts, 1990). Virtual reality simulators are very
useful to help workers and managers in learning how to perform
specific activities (both at individual and group level) that must
be repeated as often as required to in a safe environment
(Chittaro and Ranon, 2007). They could represent an effective tool
to enhance coordination and synchronization skills in groups oper-
ating in high reliability organisations (HROs). Through repeated
simulations, team members can experience group activities com-
ing to a shared understanding of why and when certain decisions
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mutual coordination and adaptation (Golzio et al., 2006). As it hap-
pens in the HROs, virtual simulators could be used to train groups
to adapt quickly and accurately to non-routine events (Waller,
1999). This use of virtual simulators is relevant in improving safety
management systems: it helps groups in abandoning quickly and
timely routines in favour of more flexible and contingent beha-
viours when unexpected and non-routine events occur; it enables
workers to acquire collectively an adequate mindfulness (Weick
and Sutcliffe, 2001). The evaluation of educational efficiency of vir-
tual reality simulation has privileged usability issues rather than
its learning efficiency. A general evaluation framework that con-
sider the multidimensionality of learning has been proposed
(Roussos et al., 1999):
 The technical dimension concerns usability issues (interface,
physical problems, hardware and software systems).
 The agency or interactivity dimension examines the interaction
between the learner and the virtual environment (navigation,
spatial orientation, presence and immersion, feedback issues).
 The affective attitude evaluate the engagement of the learner
(appreciation, confidence in the virtual environment).
 The cognitive dimension concerns the learning improvement of
the virtual experience.
 The pedagogical dimension examines how to design a virtual
reality simulation, the role of trainer/teacher, to gain knowledge
effectively by the learner.
A recent pilot study focused on the development of a 3D virtual
safety training program dealing with specific hazards and safety
measures related to grinder operation and simulating a live
hands-on environment. Results indicate that in the 3D virtual envi-
ronment participants learned more than did their peers in the
lecture-only group: on average (quiz assessment) the lecture-
only section scored 47.72%; the lecture-physical lab section scored
68.06%; the lecture-virtual exercise section scored 86.11%
(Nakayama and Jin, 2015).
3. Competences management and performance assessment –
the Plant Simulator (PS)
Managing competencies (and the associated learning processes)
in modern complex systems requires innovative approaches like
virtual reality as accidents caused by human-related tasks (i.e.
the so-called human errors), are estimated to be in the range of
50–75% (Endsley, 1995; OECD, 2003; Salmon, 2009).
The simulation-enabled approach gives muchmore flexibility to
both the trainer and the trainee to experience the out-of-specs
conditions and experience how the system (i.e. the plant) behaves
in those situations.
3.1. The Plant Simulator (PS)
The Plant Simulator (PS) is the expression coined in Colombo
et al. (2011), for chemical production sites, to address something
that is in analogy with the flight simulator paradigm. The PS is
an IT infrastructure created to replicate the exact plant conditions
and to enable both the CROP(s) and the Field Operator(s) (shortly
referred to as FOP) to cooperate as they would do in reality, i.e.
as a team. The PS allows for CROPs and FOPs to experience both
rationally and emotionally the same situations they would live in
reality in terms of process behaviour and consequences originated
by either nominal or abnormal operating conditions.
The PS comprises at least two rooms, namely the CROP room
and a FOP room, to be separated and isolated from one another,
as the CROP and the FOP(s) have not to see and hear each otheras in reality. Similarly, the CROPs and FOPs can communicate by
means of the so-called ‘‘walky-talkies”. This setting is necessary
to replicate realistic working conditions.
The three features that make an IT infrastructure a PS are as
follows:
1. The capability to allow the CROP and FOP(s) to operate in the PS
as they would do in reality with the field of operations, i.e. per-
form realistic actions as close as they are performed in reality
(in terms of gestures) and get realistic information and response
from the system.
2. The capability to emotionally involve people in the simulated
environment so that they behave the same way they would
do in reality (i.e. reach a ‘‘psychological fidelity”).
3. The capability to assess the CROP and the FOP(s) performances,
as well as those of both as a team, in real-time.
In order for a PS to reach the aforementioned features, it has to
be equipped with the following software:
 A real-time dynamic process simulator (to simulate the beha-
viour of what is occurring inside the pipework and the process
units).
 A real-time dynamic accident simulator (to simulate possible
incident/accident phenomena, e.g. leakages, pool fires, jet fires,
gas dispersions).
 A real-time tracking system (to track every action performed by
both the CROP and the FOP).
 A real-time performance assessment (to measure and assess in
real-time the performance of the CROP, the FOP and that of both
as a team).
 A suitable IT infrastructure to seamlessly link all the aforemen-
tioned components to work in real-time and allow both the
CROP and the FOP to interact with the simulated environment
and get realistic responses in terms of process behaviour and
environmental effects (i.e. noise, light, process parameters).
The PS links together, synchronously and in a multidirectional
way, all the aforementioned components to work in real-time
and allow both the CROP and the FOP to interact with the simu-
lated environment and get realistic responses in terms of process
behaviour and environmental effects (i.e. noise, light, process
parameters). In practice, this means that if a FOP opens a manual
valve in the field, the CROP has to see it (if the valve is represented)
on his/her control screen and vice versa.3.2. How a Plant Simulator looks like
The PS has to replicate the working environment in a way that,
overall, is perceived as realistic. For the FOP room, the realistic
visual perception is reached by means of an Immersive Virtual
Environment (IVE), neither a simple desktop nor a non-
immersive Virtual Reality screen, while the auditory perception
is achieved by spatial sound (the so-called 3D sound).
As (the left of) Fig. 1 shows, the realism in the CROP room is
reached by creating the exact replica of the control room, furniture
included. Typically, the CROP, once immersed in the simulation,
does not feel any differences with respect to the real control room
of the plant.
On the other hand, the FOP room is far more complicated to
replicate due to the inherent (potentially huge) dimension of the
operations field. (The right of) Fig. 1 shows a typical IVE displayed
in the FOP room. The FOP operates the equipment (i.e. interact with
them) by staying in front of the immersive screen (typically with
natural gestures). The screen size, in order to reach a good degree
Fig. 1. A typical replica of a Control Room (left) and a replica of an Immersive Virtual Environment of the Plant Simulator (right – courtesy of the Virthualis project).
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(for each FOP).
The CROP and FOP(s) rooms are connected through the PS
infrastructure.
The strength of using a PS consists of giving the possibility to
train the CROPs and the FOPs, as well as managers, as a team, thus
replicating the exact conditions of the real plant. By means of a
‘‘what if” approach, scenarios are experimentally experienced
and data are collected and automatically manipulated to generate
and display, in real-time, the Key Performance Indicators (KPI) of
each operator and those of the team.
In the PS the CROP and the FOP can perform the actions they
‘‘wish” to and those they have doubts for, as well as experience
the system response and test their capability to cope with the sce-
nario, be it a conventional (i.e. programmed), an abnormal, and
even an accident situation. The manager(s) can always be involved
in the simulation by staying in a remote room, as it would happen
in reality when staying in the crisis room, and by interacting with
the CROPs and FOPs via walkie-talkies.
3.3. Limitations overcome by the PS with respect to the OTS
Commercially, the simulation-enabled approach is covered
nowadays by the mature technology of the Operator Training Sim-
ulator (OTS). The OTS replicates the control room both physically
and behaviourally (the left side of Fig. 1 shows a typical replica
of a control room). Conceptually, OTSs are applied successfully in
different domains such as the nuclear, the avionic, the naval, the
military, the health and the process one.
The inherent limitation of the OTS is that it enables to train the
control room operator (CROP) only as the part simulating the field,
necessary to train field operators, is not technologically
implemented.
In an OTS, the scenarios CROPs are faced with are ‘‘rigidly”
implemented into the system and are always the same. The oper-
ators then stay in the simulator for days (in some companies CROPs
‘‘work” in the simulator for an entire week every year or every
semester) and go through the same scenarios repeatedly. CROPs
have not the flexibility of behaving the way they would like to,
i.e. trying the things they do not dare to try in the real plant and
whose consequences make them feeling unsecure.
There are two further limitations traditional OTSs hold, namely:
they are not designed to train FOPs and they cannot simulate inci-
dent/accident events.
In a conventional OTS the FOP part, i.e. the field operation, is not
technologically implemented because it is assumed that, given the
high level of automation, the human part that counts for managing
the plant is only the CROP. The five-year research performed
within the European project VIRTHUALIS (the largest Europeanproject on industrial safety financed by the European Commission
under the VI Framework Programme), allowed to understand that,
even in the most automated plants, the interaction between CROPs
and FOPs is fundamental to reach the correct understanding of
what is going on, and then to make the right decisions. The reason
lies in the different perspectives brought in the decision making
process by CROP and the FOP(s). Actually, the CROP sees a global
(but artificial), schematic, and plant-sensor-driven reality dis-
played in the synoptics of the control room, while the FOP sees a
partial (but real), ‘‘touchable” and human-sensor-driven reality.
The two views are complementary and, above all, incomplete. This
is why it is important that the two types of operators team up to
decide what to do next.4. The paradigm shift
4.1. From a speculative to an experimental approach in decision
making
Today, operations safety decision-making is widely grounded
on risk assessment outcomes, i.e. safety reports, whose creation
is typically outsourced to consultancy companies. In these analy-
ses, when the Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) are to be
accounted for, even for conventional systems, risk assessment
methods available today are all but robust (Skogdalen and
Vinnem, 2011). When it comes to more modern and innovative
production systems, like in the Integrated Operations (IO) scheme,
the situation gets even worse as both risk assessment and risk
management methods become weaker (Andersen and Mostue,
2012), thus imposing the adoption of new and more effective
paradigms.
For these reasons, the proposed approach is to:
1. Ground the well-known KPIs used by managers to make their
decisions on the real capabilities of operators and managers
operating in the plant.
2. Gather data on operators’ and managers’ performance (i.e. on
the real capability to operate the plant during normal and pos-
sible abnormal conditions) by means of an experimental
approach, i.e. by means of realistic experiments performed
within a PS.
This experimental approach, in contrast to the more classical
and ‘‘speculative” one (based on experts’ analysis capabilities and
experience), guarantees that decisions embed the effective capabil-
ity of the productive system to respond to both abnormal and
emergency situations, as well as to cope with daily upsets to avoid
production discontinuity.
Fig. 2. Immersive Virtual Environment of the C3/C4 separation section of a refinery
used for experiments.
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In the proposed approach the assessors, who are typically expe-
rienced CROPs and FOPs, contribute with their operational experi-
ence to the definition of the assessment software (structure,
hierarchy, logic, and weighting). Their experience is then used to
develop the algorithm that assesses, in real-time during the simu-
lation, the performance of the operators and that of the team. By
doing so, a twofold benefit is achieved, namely: (a) the assessment
variability given by the subjectivity of the trainer is avoided by
design; (b) operators’ benchmarking is made reliable, consistent,
and reproducible. Furthermore, the time spent conventionally by
the trainer to assess the trainee(s) can be conveniently and more
efficiently devoted to design new scenarios to better challenge
operators and managers, i.e. teams, with the ultimate goal of
increasing their resilience.
In the proposed technology-enabled performance assessment
approach, the technology captures the actions made by the opera-
tors (e.g. opening and closing valves – either in the field or in the
control room, communicating with colleagues, searching for equip-
ment), measures the parameters associated with these actions and,
in real-time, assesses the performance of each operator and that of
the team. Consequently, the shared, validated, and agreed subjec-
tivity is ‘‘built-in” in the algorithm once for all. In addition, its logic
applies to everybody in the same way, i.e. performance is assessed
independently on the assessor’s lucidity and feeling (as well as
tiredness and boredom).
The PS allows operators performing any needed actions (as
actions are only bounded by the laws of physics representing the
phenomenon). This is the reason why operators in a PS become
profoundly involved in the simulation and the behaviour they
show during the simulation can be assumed to be the one they
would take in reality. Thanks to this, what the PS measures about
performance can be assumed to be realistic, i.e. reflecting what
would happen in the real plant, and thus used as a viable ground
for decision-making.
The first immediate benefit is that, if the operators’ behaviour
within the simulator can be assumed to be the one they would take
in reality then the PS can be used for selecting and certifying oper-
ators. Actually, this is exactly what happens in the aviation domain
since years. Nowadays, there are no pilots worldwide that before
piloting a real aircraft have not passed the flight simulator barrier,
i.e. they must be certified through the simulator first. In addition,
even when a pilot is certified for real flights, in case s/he has to stop
piloting for a certain period, before being allowed to go back and
pilot an aircraft again s/he has to perform a certain number of
hours in the simulator and pass the test again. Therefore, the ques-
tion is: why should it not be the same for operators in the process
industry, where there are operations that are as much critical (in
terms of production continuity and safety implications) as those
required to piloting an aircraft?
The second immediate benefit is that the time spent in the PS
has a double value: for operators training and for decision-
making. Actually, if operators perform well in the PS and they
are confident about the realism of the PS, then they will feel safer
as they will feel to have good chances to cope with that situation
even in reality. In addition, the PS will give them the possibility
to experience the complexity and the difficulty of coping with both
abnormal and emergency situations, thus contributing to fade
away the dangerous complacency that might lead to an accident.
The same positive effect applies to decision-makers. Let us take
as example the shift supervisor that has to define the shifts for a
plant operation that is critical both in terms of business continuity
and safety, e.g. the switch of catalyst injectors in a polymerization
plant (Wang, 2007). Let us now suppose the shift supervisor has a
PS to train and assess the operators on that process/procedure.Then, s/he would be able to browse the simulation results obtained
in the weeks before the catalyst injectors switch, look at the oper-
ators’ performances and put on shift the one(s) who best per-
formed in the PS. By doing so, the time spent by operators in the
simulator would not only serve to train, motivate, and make them
more resilient, but would also to be used for decision making pur-
poses to daily manage the plant in a safer and more efficient way.5. The experiment campaign
5.1. The goal of the experiment campaign
The goal of the experiments performed in the PS was to under-
stand and, above all, measure the impact of Immersive Virtual
Reality (IVR) on the performance of industrial operators when fac-
ing abnormal situations.
In order to reach this goal, the last two years of research were
focused on two main streams, namely:
1. Designing and implementing an accident scenario in the PS
involving both the CROP and the FOP.
2. Designing and developing an algorithm (within the PS frame-
work) capable to automatically measuring, objectively and in
real-time, the performance of operators.
Questions like ‘‘Does IVR truly increase performance?” and,
given it does, ‘‘What is the extent to which performance is
increased?” are the main questions our experiment campaign
focused on and whose results are described hereafter.
5.2. The experiment scenario implemented in the PS
The context implemented in the PS is a C3/C4 separation section
of a crude-oil refinery. Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of the IVR used for
the experiment.
Typically, in a C3/C4 separation section, there are flammable
and hazardous hydrocarbons involved. The accident scenario
implemented in the PS is that of a ‘‘hot work” being performed
in the field in which something goes wrong. Specifically, an exca-
vator working close to the C3/C4 distillation unit accidentally hits
a pipe in which is flowing a stream of pressurized liquid butane
(C4). The collision breaks the integrity of a flange of the C4 pipe
resulting in a liquid jet and in the spreading of a pool on the
ground. Fig. 3 shows the accident event (i.e. the leak and the fire).
After a given time (the same for all participants), an ignition
source ignites the pool and generates a fire. As soon as the collision
occurs, the FOP is supposed to report the event to the CROP. Once
the FOP identifies and acknowledges the leakage, the CROP and the
Fig. 3. Liquid jet of butane as a consequence of flange integrity rupture (left) and pool fire of butane as a consequence of the leakage from the flange (right – both courtesy of
the Virthualis company).
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once agreed, the CROP closes the automatic remotely-operated
valve necessary to cut off the flow of butane in the pipe, thereby
stopping also the outflow from the ruptured flange.
To avoid any inconsistency, the CROP’s role is played always by
the same expert person who perfectly knows how to operate and
interact aseptically and unbiased with the FOP who undergoes
the experiment.
The FOP is also required to acknowledge the shutoff of the
liquid jet and report it to the CROP. The next event to occur is
the ignition of the spreading pool. In this situation, the FOP is
expected to become aware of the situation and immediately report
the fire to the CROP. The CROP then performs the necessary actions
(e.g. s/he alerts the internal fire fighters team). However, the
situation is not over as, because of the closing of the automatic
valve in the DCS (to block the C4 outflow), the reboiler level
starts increasing. The two operators (i.e. CROP and FOP) have to
cooperate/interact in order to flush off the liquid in excess in the
reboiler and control its pressure. Consequently, the FOP has to
identify and open the correct manually operated valve (i.e. the
one shown during the training session). Table 1 summarizes the
sequence of the simulated events. All participants of Group A and
B performed the same exact sequence reported in Table 1.
5.3. The key performance indicators for operators
The performance measurement and the associated assessment
for every FOP/trainee/participant is based on specific KPIs and
the comparison is made with respect to the aforementioned two
distinct training methods, namely:
 A slide-supported presentation (typically used in industry after
a critical accident or near miss has occurred).
 An immersive 3D training environment.Table 1
Description of relevant assessment steps.
Steps Description of the events
1 The FOP is at the C3/C4 separation section of the refinery (see Fig. 2)
2 The excavator hits a pipe and breaks a flange
3 The liquid leaks from the ruptured flange (see Fig. 3) and spreads on
the ground creating a pool
4 The pool gets ignited and a pool fire starts burning (see Fig. 3)
5 The FOP alerts the CROP (who interacts with the FOP)
6 The CROP closes a remotely controlled valve (from DCS)
7 The outflow stops but the liquid level in the reboiler starts increasing
and reaches the high level alarm
8 The CROP asks the FOP to open a manually operated valve (FOV) to
decrease the reboiler level and then to close it back again (to recover
the original operating conditions)
9 The reboiler level decreases back to the correct valueBoth methods were used during the briefing phase of the
experiment.
In case of an industrial operator, the measurement and the asso-
ciated assessment of the KPIs do not make any difference. The KPIs
for a human being should reflect the decisions made and the
actions performed vis-à-vis the plant, which are the driving force
for the assessment. An action then is not good or bad in itself but
it is so in relation to the timing, magnitude, effects, and the associ-
ated consequences it causes to the plant. The same applies for the
assessment of the difficulty in performing cognitive tasks. The task
is complex not just in itself but in relation to the context where it is
to be performed (i.e. the complexity of the context).
Before computing a KPI of an operator/trainee, it is necessary to
define its nature and analyse its corresponding consistency and
feasibility. The consistency feature reflects the human factors and
those intangible attributes that are rather distant from both exten-
sive and intensive variables of industrial processes.
To enable the minimization of the consequences (i.e. the C4 leak
from the flange), nine key parameters were selected, namely: (1)
hints provided, (2) message repetition, (3) leakage identification,
(4) valve I identification, (5) fire reporting, (6) valve II identifica-
tion, (7) pool diameter, (8) flame height, and (9) total time taken.
These parameters were used to build the proposed KPIs used to
assess the FOP. Amongst the many KPIs it was possible to design
(see also Henderson and Feiner (2009) for further details), those
proposed refer to the specific scenario implemented in the PS
(and described above).
According to the experience gained within the 5-year research
of the Virthualis European project, the performance of (industrial)
operators is so much bounded and dependent on the specificity of
both the procedures adopted and the operating conditions of the
plant at stake that its measurement must be tailored accordingly.1
In practice, the deployment of the performance assessment module
(of the PS) depends on the procedure, conditions, and situation that
are to be addressed and evaluated on a case-by-case basis (i.e. for
each plant).
5.4. The experiment participants – the guinea pigs selection and the
grouping
Participants that took part to the experiment were 24
(Male = 20) and they were split into two groups, comprising 12
participants each. They aged in the range between 19 and 22 years
(average 20.8 years and SD 1.03 year) and were students attending
the third year of the bachelor degree in Chemical Engineering at
the Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy. To ensure a homogenous1 For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting that the KPIs built (on the nine
parameters measured) to assess the overall performance of operators and managers
are not described in this paper as the ultimate goal of the paper was that of presenting
the viability of using IVE both to assess and increase operators’ and managers
performance.’
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understanding), students of the same course and year were
selected.2
According to the scientific literature, groups used to perform
experiments of similar typology in other domains, such as the avi-
ation and the nuclear domains, are in the range of 8–10 partici-
pants for each group (Dehais et al., 2012; Silva et al., 2012; Paige
Bacon and Strybel, 2012; Cai and Lin, 2011). Thus the number of
participants used for the experiment campaign can be assumed
to be in line with the number needed and used since years in the
scientific community for this type of experiments.3
5.5. The experiment environment
The experiment of the 24 participants was performed in the
neutrality of the environmental variables that were kept constant.
This means that the environmental conditions, such as light or
noise, were not used as performance shaping factors (PSF) (i.e. they
were not used to make the task harder to face). Fig. 4 ought to visu-
ally clarify the neutrality concept with the respect of the environ-
mental variables.
In principle, given that the PS allows for changing the environ-
mental conditions in real-time (i.e. light, noise, wind speed and
direction, clouds, fog, snow, visibility), we could have performed
the experiment during the sunset of a foggy day, thus making it
more difficult for participants both to find themselves in the envi-
ronment (orientation) and to identify the right equipment. Then
we would have not been able to assess the weight of light and
fog on performance because the benchmark (i.e. the performance
in neutral conditions) was not available.
Actually, reading the same pressure gauge either at optimal
daylight condition (no reflections) or at the sunset (reduced visibil-
ity) makes the task substantially different (the former being easier
than the latter).
Overall, the design, organization, and arrangement of the exper-
iment campaign took about one year to develop. This time includes
the experiment design, people profiling and selection, scenario and
KPIs implementation in the PS, as well as coding the performance
algorithm for the specific experiment.
5.6. The training context
Before performing the assessment, the two groups needed to be
trained properly on the accident scenario that hypothetically hap-
pened in the plant. Group A, wearing 3D passive glasses, was
trained within the PS with the stereoscopic feature activated (the
stereoscopic feature is necessary to provide the sense of depth,
which is fundamental to increase immersivity).
(The left of) Fig. 5 shows the experimental environment used
even as a training room for Group A during the briefing phase.
Group Bwas trained using a ‘‘conventional” slide-supported pre-
sentation comprising twelve slides. Images from the 3D virtual
environment (used for Group A) were used to prepare the slides
for the presentation (images consistency). (The right of) Fig. 5 shows
the classroom environment. Both training sessions lasted about 1 h.
To keep the two training methods comparable, i.e. not activat-
ing further cognitive channels in one group only, the spatial sound
and the Augmented Virtual Reality (AVR) features of the PS were2 The participants were volunteers who responded to an open call and were
deliberately not paid for their participation. This choice was done with the purpose of
ensuring homogeneity and harmonization even in terms of motivation (i.e. partic-
ipants to be driven by the interest of taking part to a scientific experiment).
3 One of the reasons it was decided not to splitting the 24 participants into 3 groups
of 8 participants each was that of increasing the reliability of the experiment (given
that, to our knowledge, this type of experiment, with the support of a PS, has been
performed for the first time).both disabled. This choice was necessary for the two training
methods to activate in the trainee just the visual and the listening
senses (i.e. two cognitive channels), and neither the auditory nor
the extra visual channel provided by AVR4 (Nazir et al., 2012).5.7. The experiment setting and execution
Thanks to the tracking features implemented in the PS, it was
possible to measure, record and process in real-time (i.e. during
the experiment) several interaction parameters aimed at evaluat-
ing the performance of operators (in this case, the students).
Each participant was tested individually without anybody else
attending. This choice was made intentionally to increase the sim-
ilarity of the simulation environment with the real plant. In addi-
tion, it was opted to keep constant the time between the training
and the assessment sessions in order to avoid any discrepancies
between short-term and long-term memories. To equalize the
assessment and get consistent results, the same highly trained
and expert person, who used the same phrases, hints, and times
to interact with participants, played the role of the CROP. In addi-
tion, the same expert person was in charge of the training sessions
of both groups and made them lasting the same amount of time.
The CROP operated in a separate room from that of the FOP and,
to replicate realistic conditions, the two could neither see nor
directly hear each other. The communication between the CROP
and the FOP was done via walkie-talkies only (as it happens in real-
ity). Finally, to ensure ‘‘clean” results, all participants played only
the FOP’s role.6. Results and discussion
Participants who were trained in the 3D environment (Group A)
performed undoubtedly better than those trained with the slide-
supported training containing 3D images of the C3/C4 separation
section (Group B).
During the experiment, the aforementioned nine parameters
were measured. Specifically, the first parameter measured was
the number of hints provided to participants. Actually, hints were
provided according to the actions performed and requests made by
participants (i.e. their acting in the (virtual) field). To preserve the
experiment consistency, such hints were the same (in terms of
contents and tone) for all participants. Just to give an example, if
the participant found him/herself lost in the (virtual) plant (e.g.
s/he was getting far from the accident scenario), s/he was advised
to move towards the accident scene. This hint was given after a
specific and constant time interval, chosen to be 90 s.
As (the left of) Fig. 6 clearly shows, the number of hints given to
participants of Group A were significantly lower than those given
to Group B, and, for some participants, were even absent (t(20)
= 3.05, p < 0.006).
Specifically, in 41% of the cases, participants of Group A did not
even ask for hints (i.e. absent bars in left of Fig. 6). In the remaining
59% of the cases when Group A participants asked for hints, they
needed much less hints to orient themselves in the context and fig-
ure out what to do next. Numerically, the participants of Group A
requested 11 hints whilst participants of Group B requested 29
hints. This translates into 164% more hints needed by Group B with
respect to Group A.
Normalizing the overall number of hints, one discovers that
Group A requested an average of 0.92 hints per participant, while4 For the sake of clarity, the AVR feature superimposes to the screen some
dditional bits of information, which are not available in the real environment.
hanks to the augmented information provided, the user can better understand what
he is experiencing. As an example, the blue window at top left of (the right of) Fig. 3
ports the thermal load dynamics on the FOP in case of pool fire.a
T
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Fig. 4. Pressure gauge at neutral daylight conditions (no refraction, optimal readability – left) and at the sunset (diminished reading capability – right).
Fig. 5. The two training methods: 3D immersive training (left) and classroom (slide-supported) training (right).
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participant of Group A (ID 1–12) and Group B (ID 13–24) – lower is better (right).
S. Colombo, L. Golzio / Safety Science 84 (2016) 46–56 53group B requested an average of 2.42 hints per participant. Given
that the number of hint requests by participant of Group B were
fairly equally distributed, we can assume that not just Group B
(i.e. the overall sample) needed more hints to cope with the situa-
tion but on average each individual of Group B needed more hints.
This means that there were not any outliers moving the team
average and that almost all participants behaved in a similar way.
Actually, with reference to Group B, there was just one partici-
pant over 12 who did not need any hints. This result was widely
compensated by the rest of participants asking for an average of
2.63 hints each.
The second measured parameter, which is tightly coupled to the
number of hints, is the number of voice message repetitions
required by participants to the (person playing the role of the)
CROP. This value is particularly important because it is a strong
indicator of the level of confidence the operator has with the situ-
ation (i.e. it reflects the operator’s situation awareness). Actually,
the more one knows about something, the lower the difficulty in
understanding the message when it is not communicated clearlyin terms of both volume and speaking clarity (walkie-talkies are
naturally affected by noise disturbances due to electromagnetic
interferences).
As (the right of) Fig. 6 clearly shows, the number of repetitions
requested by participants of Group A is significantly lower than
those requested by participants of Group B. This demonstrates
much less capacity from participants of Group B to understand
the hints requested by and provided to them to cope with the sit-
uation. Overall, in 67% of the cases participants of Group A did not
ask for any repetitions while this percentage for Group B drops to
58%. In addition, among those who asked for repetition, 80% of
Group B asked for two repetitions, against none of Group A. Thus,
even for this KPI, Group A outperformed Group B by a 125% differ-
ence in message repetitions.
The subsequent four parameters measured and used for assess-
ing the training level of participants refer to the equipment identi-
fication (fault diagnosis) and localization (orientation). These
parameters are particularly important as they influence the final
impact of an abnormal situation. If the operator successfully and
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Fig. 8. Averaged pool diameter during the experiments for Group A and Group B.
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abnormal situation, the possible damage can be reduced
significantly.
In the given scenario, the simulated accident requires the oper-
ator to prove at four stages of the experiment his/her fault identi-
fication and diagnosis skills gained during the training session. In
the accident timeline, these four stages are as follows: leakage
identification, DCS valve identification (i.e. valve I), (timely) fire
reporting, and, lastly, the manual valve identification (i.e. valve
II). The identification-related parameters were separately grouped
from the reporting-related one.
Fig. 7 shows both the identification capabilities (i.e. identifica-
tion of valve I, valve II and the leak), and the reporting capabilities
(i.e. reporting the fire).0
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Fig. 9. Comparison of maximum flame height for each participant of Group A (ID 1–12) a
finalize the experiment (right).Looking at the results it is evident that Group A outperformed
Group B both in the identification and in reporting capabilities,
thus showing a higher level of situation awareness, concentration
and reactivity.
The seventh parameter measured to assess the performance of
operators was the maximum pool diameter reached during the
accident (i.e. a consequence-related parameter). Clearly, the smal-
ler the pool generated by the leak, the better the FOP performance.
This is because it is assumed that a smaller pool diameter means a
quicker reaction of the FOP (response time) in identifying (fault
diagnosis) and reporting (communication & coordination) the leak-
age to the CROP (who is in charge to closing the valve to cut off the
leakage).
Further, smaller pool diameters reduce the potential conse-
quences that might be generated by a possible ignition. This is sim-
ply because the possible damages both to the surrounding
equipment (including domino effects) and to the operators stand-
ing nearby the fire depend on the flame height and the associated
heat radiated. Therefore, it is assumed that the final pool diameter,
which is calculated in real-time by the dynamic accident simulator
(Manca et al., 2013) working synergistically with the dynamic pro-
cess simulator in the PS, is directly correlated to the response capa-
bilities of the participants (i.e. the FOPs) of each group. Fig. 8 shows
the pool diameters (vs. time) for Group A and B.
It is evident, even for this parameter, that the average pool
diameter ‘‘generated” by participants of Group A is smaller than
that of Group B. The trends of the pool diameter shown in Fig. 8
can be explained as follows: the pool keeps increasing up to when
the upstream valve (with respect to the ruptured flange) is closed
(i.e. around 60 s for Group A and around 100 s for Group B). Then
the pool diameter starts decreasing slowly, due to the evaporation
process, up to when the pool is ignited. After ignition, the decrease
is much faster due to the burning rate.
Numerically, the averaged maximum pool diameter generated
by Group A is 1.42 m, while that generated by Group B is 1.65 m.
This translates into a 26% larger area of the butane pool. Simulta-
neously, the dimension of the pool is related directly to the time
taken by the operators to figure out what is going on, take the nec-
essary decisions, and perform the necessary actions to stop the
leak.
The time taken by Group A to stop the leak is around 61 s, while
that taken by Group B is around 106 s. This translates into a 42%
shorter time needed by participants of Group A, with respect to
those of Group B, to cope with the situation (which might be seen
as a 74% longer reaction time of Group B in coping with the23 24
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Table 2
Summary of KPIs measured for Group A and Group B.
KPI Group A
(mean)
Group B
(mean)
Relative difference w.r.t.
Group A
100  Value BValue AValue A
 
(%)
Hints given 0.917 2.417 +163.64
Voice message
repetitions
0.333 0.750 +125.00
Leakage
identification
0.667 0.417 37.50
Valve Identification
(I)
0.833 0.500 40.00
Fire Reporting 0.667 0.417 37.50
Valve Identification
(II)
0.750 0.500 33.33
Maximum pool
diameter [m]
1.562 1.966 +25.87
Maximum flame
height [m]
4.266 5.955 +39.57
Total time of
experiment
4 min 8 s 4 min 58 s +20.17
S. Colombo, L. Golzio / Safety Science 84 (2016) 46–56 55accident scenario). Both these results are far more marked if one
considers that participants of Group B requested/received much
more messages/hints than those of Group A.
The eighth KPI is the maximum flame height for each partici-
pant. (The left of) Fig. 9 shows the different between the two
groups in this respect.
The maximum flame height reached by Group A is 4.26 m, while
that of Group B is 5.95 m. This translates into a nearly 40% higher
flame height reached by Group B with respect to Group A.
Finally, the ninth parameter measured is the total time taken by
participants to complete the experiment. It represents the respon-
siveness and attention allocation abilities. (The right of) Fig. 9
shows the time taken by Group A and Group B. The shorter the
time, the better the performance, and eventually the lower the
impact of the accident.
According to our understanding and observations during the
experiment, the participants trained in the 3D environment got a
better picture and understanding of the process, equipment loca-
tions, as well as valve positions and functioning. The enhanced
capabilities enabled them to achieve better results in shorter times.
Table 2 summarizes the different KPIs measured for both groups.
It is evident that Group A outperformed Group B in all KPIs mea-
sured during the experiment. Specifically, the last column of the
table summarises the relative difference of Group B with respect
to Group A.7. Conclusions
The results of the experiment campaign conducted in the PS
take to the conclusion that IVR allows to improving operators’ per-
formance through a deeper, contextual understanding (i.e. emo-
tionally grounded). This holds for all KPIs tested. Further, given
that the PS allows for reaching the so-called psychological fidelity,
it can be reasonably assumed that the behaviours shown in the PS
are those that will be recorded in reality, thus making both feasible
and reliable the use of simulation results for decision-making pur-
poses. In practice, this translates into the possibility of paving the
way towards a more reliable, simulation-enabled, experimental-
based decision-making process in operations safety.
The experiment campaign conducted do not certainly allow to
unveiling all the pros and cons of using IVEs for training and
decision-making purposes. Nevertheless, the results achieved are
encouraging and can be seen as an important milestone towards
the certification and selection of operators and managers for
managing and operating complex process systems.Acknowledgements
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